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### Fall and Rise of Religion and Rhetoric\*

*Riassunto:* Il rapporto tra retorica e religione può essere analizzato dal punto di vista di un denominatore comune: l'aspetto comunicativo. Si possono identificare diverse direzioni della comunicazione religiosa, tendenzialmente persuasiva: da dio a uomo, da uomo a dio, da uomo ad uomo. Le diverse forme possono essere esemplificate attraverso il ricorso a testi che vanno dal *VecchioTestamento* fino alla letteratura contemporanea.

As each of us knows, «the angel of the Lord appeared to Moses in flames of fire from within a bush. [...] When the Lord saw that he had gone over to look, God called to him from within the bush, "Moses! Moses!" And Moses said, "Here I am"». <sup>1</sup> After God had instructed Moses on what he needed to tell the Egyptians, «Moses answered, "What if they do not believe me or listen to me and say, 'The Lord did not appear to you'?"». <sup>2</sup>

Nevertheless, God provided Moses with the means to make the Egyptians see – rather than just believe in – his supernatural powers:

Moses said to the Lord, "O Lord, I have never been eloquent, neither in the past nor since you have spoken to your servant. I am slow of speech and tongue." <sup>3</sup> The Lord said to him, "Who gave man his mouth? Who makes him deaf or mute? Who gives him sight or makes him blind? Is it not I, the

Lord? 12 Now go; I will help you speak and will teach you what to say." But Moses said, "O Lord, please send someone else to do it." Then the Lord's anger burned against Moses and he said, "What about your brother, Aaron the Levite? I know he can speak well. He is already on his way to meet you, and his heart will be glad when he sees you. 15 You shall speak to him and put words in his mouth; I will help both of you speak and will teach you what to do. 16 He will speak to the people for you, and it will be as if he were your mouth and as if you were God to him. 17 But take this staff in your hand so you can perform miraculous signs with it."<sup>4</sup>

Are we allowed to take these passages of *Exodus* as a model for the relationship between religion and rhetoric?

As complex as the definition of my paper's two subjects may be, I still believe that they share 'communication' as a sort of basic common ground – although their form and aim may differ decisively. One may communicate to persuade, communicate to inform, communicate to order somebody to do something, and in these cases the efficiency of the words employed will depend on the condition (or status) of both the speaker and the audience.

Religion, on the other hand, has been defined from an anthropological point of view as «a system of communication – if rather a special form. It is apparently designed to communicate with beings who are on the one hand invisible and on the other hand so categorically different and superior that normal communication is impossible».<sup>5</sup>

But now let us reflect for just one moment on Mose's insecurity as he questions his ability to correctly and persuasively diffuse the word of God. His fear doubtlessly has its origin in the sensed disproportion, which is about to manifest itself in the transformation of the communicative triangle: from a divine speaker transmitting his message to a human being we pass to the level of entirely human communication. In fact, a similar situation is described by Aeschines (IV. century BC) in his speech *Against Timarchos* (180-181), although the scene does not properly belong to the genre of

religious communication, but to that of 'speech in front of a public audience', here an assembly. Likewise, the resulting political anxiety does not originate in the orator himself, but in his audience, the Elders, who are twentyeight men elected for life from all the nobles over sixty:

When someone had made a speech in the Spartan assembly, a man who had lived shamefully, but was an exceptionally able speaker, and the Spartans, the story goes, were about to vote in favour of his motion, there came forward one of the Elders. [...] One of them came forward, it is said, and strongly chastized the Spartans, and denounced them in terms like this, that they would not for a long time inhabit an unravaged Sparta, if they used in their assemblies advisers like that. And at the same time he called forward another of the Spartans, a man not well-favoured at speaking, but conspicuous in war and remarkable for justice and moral endurance, and commanded him to express the same sentiments, as best he could, which the former speaker had expressed, 'so that the Spartans may vote when they had heard a good man making the speech, but do not receive into their ears the voices of those proved to be cowards and evil' (transl. N. Fisher).

Up to now we have spoken about communication, but the two cases under discussion, that is cases questioning the persuasive capacity of the word, have touched only one type of communicative transfer, namely that between man and man, which comprises both political and religious types of communication. In Moses' case, the speaker fears his incapacity to adequately report the word of God and believes to lack the necessary persuasiveness in his discourse with other human beings; in the case of the Spartan assembly we encounter the contrary anxiety (on part of the audience), namely that great eloquence may lead to an orator's success despite his moral unworthiness so that even an excellent political proposal is made suspicious by the rhetorical brilliance of its eloquent supporter. In the Lord's first response to Moses' doubtful question, however, we perceive a certain devaluation of human rhetoric and learn, that it is in fact God's word and action that determines the success of the persuasion. Nevertheless, Moses insistently denies to be the right person to carry

God's message to the people and so eventually the Lord, though rather irritated, convinces himself to choose 'a good orator'. Of course we might comment that Moses' argumentation was actually strong enough to convince even God himself and thus prefigures the communicative transfer with which he will successfully bring his message to the people: «You shall speak to him and put words in his mouth; I will help both of you speak and will teach you what to do. He will speak to the people for you, and it will be as if he were your mouth and as if you were God to him».<sup>6</sup>

On the other hand, it would be wrong to believe, that religious communication develops only between man and man. Instead, as we have already seen, God too may choose to communicate with a human while a human may in turn speak with God. Of course, from within the point of view of polytheistic religions - as found for example in ancient Greek or Roman culture - one may also analyze various types of communication between gods. The epic poets solved this problem by assigning thoroughly human characters to this type of communication, as has been well explained by Françoise Bader:<sup>7</sup>

Who are the *authors* of the "language of the gods", wrongly so named because it is also that of men (the human and divine names being the usual vs. the poetic – therefore hermetic – ones)? The language of the gods consists in "speaking" the order of the world, enigmatically: "the gods like darkness" ; and the function of the poet is to translate it into a language iconically adapted to that of the gods by the enigmatic methods they employ: the poet, who is naturally the author of the "language of the gods", "speaks the divine order of the world" as a *thespis*; and like the Brahmins, who, knowing the four quarters of the speech, keep three of them secret among themselves, so that the non-initiate may hold but one, the poet-authors of the double appellations of the "language of the gods" are the brilliant masters of "the obscure language of the poets".

With regard to monotheistic religions instead, only a paradoxical reasoning could accept the idea of communication between god and god, capable, at the same time, to impose peace between religions instead of religious war (which is, by the way, a typically human matter).

Of course, this makes studying the communication between two gods more difficult – if not impossible – especially since Christ too addresses his divine father in his human capacity, that is, from man to God. Thus, I would like to develop my paper's next argument based on the remaining three modes of religious communication (as far as it is considered rhetorical communication), that is: from God to man, from man to God and from man to man.

Let's remember that, after the words of the ten commandments had resounded, «When the people saw the thunder and lightning and heard the trumpet and saw the mountain in smoke, they trembled with fear. They stayed at a distance and said to Moses, "Speak to us yourself and we will listen. But do not have God speak to us or we will die».<sup>8</sup>

It seems that from those words man has gathered the firm idea – an idea born of human fear – that communication between God and man cannot be collective on the part of the audience: only privileged men may listen to the words of God, who communicates his wishes. Already the diffusion of the divine message among men, the responsibility of the chosen one, presents itself as a tricky question of efficient rhetoric.

But let's go backwards for a moment in our story of the origins: can we actually say that there is a problem in the religious and rhetorical communication in *Genesis* 3.1-5? Let's read it once again:

Now the serpent was more crafty than any of the wild animals the Lord God had made. He said to the woman, "Did God really say, 'You must not eat from any tree in the garden'?" 2. The woman said to the serpent, "We may eat fruit from the trees in the garden, 3 but God did say, 'You must not eat fruit from the tree that is in the middle of the garden, and you must not touch it, or you will die.'

4 "You will not surely die" the serpent said to the woman. 5 "For God knows that when you eat of it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil."

In the account's narrative and mimetic structure, the serpent exploits the resources of a rhetorical question, forcing Eve to recount in detail the previous communication between God and man on the question of the fruit: the freedom to eat fruit from all the fruit trees except the one in the center of the garden. The prohibition had been reinforced by a certain threat with dangerous consequences. The serpent's subsequent observation deconstructs this communication at its root, claiming it to be false, to be a lie: the Lord has concealed, has hidden the true reality – man can be like a god, if he wants to. The following account will show us, however, that it was really the serpent who simulated feelings of friendship for men, using itself a mendacious but highly efficient mode of speech, as Tertullian proclaims – although he wrongly attributes it to Eve: *tu es quae eum suasisti, quem diabolus aggredi non valuit*.<sup>9</sup> In reality: «The man said, "The woman you put here with me—she gave me some fruit from the tree, and I ate it».<sup>10</sup> As I already mentioned in Los Angeles biennial conference, Adam potentially could have refused to eat the forbidden fruit!<sup>11</sup>

But it is time to turn now from the story of the origins, which, as all literary stories, has lent itself well to the analysis of rhetorical communication mechanisms. With this story we also turn from communication between god and man in order to have another look at the relationship between religion and rhetoric or, more particularly, at modes of communication from man to man. At the conference in Los Angeles, Laurent Pernot talked about an obvious parallel between rhetoric and religion, but also about the immense subject of rhetoric and religion.<sup>12</sup> I'm completely in agreement with him: one should always talk about religion in the plural and about religious phenomena in the singular just as the rhetoric phenomenon of persuasive communication is – as such and every time – a singular event while concepts of rhetoric in diverse cultures are multiple. Well, every paper on this argument will necessarily make a merely partial contribution. Laurent Pernot also said:

additionally, we are today witnessing the return of religion<sup>13</sup> and, as I'd like to add – and the ISHR's vivacity confirms this – we are today witnessing also the return of rhetoric.

In the title of this paper I have employed a formula used upside down: fall and rise. In general, we are used to talking about 'rise and fall', thus following an analogical structure. The analogy, which presents itself as «a form of historical comprehension»,<sup>14</sup> has trained us (and here in particular with regard to the ancient world) to recognize or to foresee a certain course and direction within the world's social and political – or should I say: human – structures, that is, the sequence from rise to fall. Similarly, human life takes its natural course, *physei*, along these lines. Great empires are born and decline, just as influential ideologies. A Latin proverb of vernacular origin says: «Quo altior mons tanto profundior vallis». In order to be better appreciated, a reversed sequence, fall and rise, will have to lose its characteristic of a 'microsequence' and will have to become part of a 'macrosequence' which, however, will inevitably restore the so-called natural direction: rise and fall. When Solon, the wise Athenian statesman and poet encountered Croesus, king of Lydia, a man famous for his wealth, he reminded him – or better, he asked him – to reflect on the fact, that the final judgement on every possession – and thus on every kind of power – will be pronounced only after the end, to allow to consider the course of a man's life as a whole, since god often enables us to catch a glimpse of happiness only to then destroy us at the roots.<sup>15</sup>

There has been, however, a certain event, a certain matter, which has been narrated and handed down over time with great conviction - despite the fact that it isn't objectively convincing. It's an event, which has entered the analogical repertory and has reversed the sequence in a truly exceptional manner: I'm talking about a death followed by a resurrection: fall and rise. That religion, or better religions, are born to do exactly this, namely to reverse the natural sequence of human life at least in people's expectations, is a deep and complex issue I can only hint at.

But it is certain, that religious and rhetorical communication from man to man is also about this. As for the communication from man to god, Joe Brainard, author of a collection of a phrasesbook of memories which inspired Georges Perec's *Je me souviens*, put it like this: «I remember having a

casual chat with God every night and usually falling asleep before I said ‘Amen’».<sup>16</sup> But apart from literary playfulness, it is this type of religious communication which seems to have been studied and analyzed most profoundly and I can’t help but refer once more to Laurent Pernot’s quoted article, which provides us with a general frame.

Once a general picture of religious communication from man to god has been defined, rhetoric eventually intervenes in types of communication from man to man.

From this point of view rhetoric has offered, and is still offering itself as a persuasive or ‘commemorative’ instrument for internal communication within a certain religion, but also as an instrument of comparison in a religion’s relationship with other religions.

The discourse from the pulpit, the art of preaching, recently analyzed by Siegfried Wenzel,<sup>17</sup> characterizes Christian religion in particular and has always sought the good company of rhetorical arts. Not without reason – and here I talk about the Italian situation – newspapers have recently reported a widespread uneasiness within the hierarchies of the Catholic Church over the low level of communication in Sunday masses and sermons, which has led to the idea to provide courses and special training to enable preachers to preach with greater sentiment and efficiency.<sup>18</sup> The clear reference to a technique, an art of rhetoric in persuasive communication suggests once more the ancient dilemma between technique and spontaneity, which characterized the situation in the churches in 16th. / 17th. century Italy, and formed a dividing line, although not a rigorous one, between the Jesuits and the Capuchins. The first were ardent supporters of an all-encompassing oratory, the others tended to limit rhetoric to the context of school education: Gaetano Maria da Bergamo, a Capuchin, summarizes this formula in his tract on sacred rhetoric with the title *L’uomo apostolico istruito nella sua vocazione al pulpito per il ministero della sacra eloquenza* (1729): «Fides ex auditu, auditus autem per verbum Christi; e l’uomo apostolico deve conformarsi agli apostoli che ‘loquebantur Verbum Dei cum fiducia’, operando le conversioni colla parola in rapporto all’udito, senza curarsi di porre sott’agli occhi della gente nient’altro, se non che il buon esempio».<sup>19</sup>

On the other hand, another writer whom I can't possibly not quote here in Strasbourg has written impassioned words on the subject of the pulpit. It is Jean de la Bruyère, translator and censor of public morality, author of the translation of the theophrastean *Characters*, as well as author of the work *Caractères ou les mœurs de ce siècle*, published with corrections and additions between 1688 and 1694. La Bruyère dedicates a chapter to the pulpit, *la chaire*. I will limit myself to quote only one passage, which seem useful to our subject: «L'orateur fa de si belles images de certains desordres, y fait entrer des circonstances si délicates, met tant d'esprit, de tour et de raffinement dans celui qui pêche, que si je n'ai pas de pente à vouloir ressembler à ses portraits, j'ai besoin du moins que quelque apôtre, avec un style plus chrétien, me dégoûte des vices dont l'on m'avait fait une peinture si agréable».<sup>20</sup>

As I anticipated, religious communication from man to man can also be, and should be, the instrument that facilitates comparison and dialogue between different religions. Only recently, about a year ago, we were able to witness an example – although a rather unfortunate one - in Joseph Ratzinger's, that is, Pope Benedict's XVIth learned quotation during a discourse at the University of Regensburg. The quotation regarded the controversies (the seventh to be precise) between Manuel the II Paleologus and a Persian master, a *mudarris* of Muslim faith, which took place in 1391/92 in the surroundings of modern Ancara. Even today the reading of the entire controversy is very instructive. Like in most interreligious dialogues or disputes - just as generally in discussions based on unquestionable principles or dogma - the speakers' rhetorical objective is often far from clear: some may be led by the desire to meet on some common ground while others will strive to weaken their counterpart's principles in the course of the argumentation, so as to be able to dictate the rules of the final outcome. Well, Théodore Khoury, the editor of the seventh controversy quoted so expressedly by Pope Benedict the XVIth, comments disconsolately at the end of his *Introduction*:

Essayons de montrer à présent comment les positions doctrinales de l'un et de l'autre ont condamné cette controverse à être, encore une fois, non point un vrai dialogue mais une espèce de double monologue. Il y avait certes des points sur lesquels les deux parties pouvaient se rencontrer. Mais, même là, les divergences profondes de la doctrine d'ensemble empêchaient que l'on se comprît tout à fait.<sup>21</sup>

But this problem regards exactly human rhetoric communication among the so-called religions of the book.

If religion has always made use of rhetoric, may we not doubt then, that religion may contribute to success of rhetoric: I want to cite a passage from Bryan Garsten's recent volume, *Saving Persuasion*, which I found particularly enlightening:

The constraints that the quest for unanimity imposes on political discourse can often rule over out precisely the types of arguments that would be most persuasive to certain audiences. The most familiar and perhaps the most contentious examples are again those concerning religion. Do arguments based on sacred texts, for example, count as acceptable forms of deliberative argument? What about arguments from faith? As abolitionists, prohibitionists, civil-rights leaders and other activists have all shown, arguments that invoke biblical language and ideas will often be the most effective way of engaging the judgement of certain audiences and trying to persuade them.<sup>22</sup>

Now, Garsten's response to the question of how religious and other specific types of rhetoric relate to the audience's process of 'deliberation' mostly depends on what we call 'deliberation' (a question I consider particularly relevant for Italy): «If we mean a process of legitimizing one shared and authoritative perspective from which to judge all public controversies, perhaps we will be reluctant to include such rhetoric. But if we mean by deliberation a process of drawing upon citizens' capacity for judgement, we will be more likely to admit the value of such forms of speech».

In conclusion, I would still like to cite some cases in which religion and religious writings with their symbols, myths and protagonists actually seem to serve rhetoric and its techniques. The most ancient example I'll cite regards the title of a little poem, which is contained in the so-called *Codex Visionum* (second half of the IV. to the beginning of the V. century AD), today in the Bodmer and Chester Beatty collection: *What could Cain have said as he killed Abel?*. As we can see, we're dealing with an *ethopoiia*.<sup>23</sup>

The preparatory exercises (*progymnasmata*) don't suffer from dogmatic hesitations to confront religious and sacred objects. This is confirmed some centuries later by Father Joseph Jouvençy's *Candidatus Rhetoricae*, a manual written in 1711 in the environment of Jesuit education. The fourth part of the manual, after *inventio*, *dispositio* and *elocutio*, is unexpectedly dedicated to *amplificatio*.<sup>24</sup> On *amplificatio*, drawn from a listing of circumstances, I choose the following example (p. 95): «Judas a trahi le Christ. Après avoir réuni toutes les circonstances (qui a trahi? Qui a-t-il trahi? À qui a-t-il livré le Christ? and so on) vous amplifierez chacune d'elles, et vous exposerez la trahison de Judas de la manière suivante». Here's the first circumstance: who betrayed?: «Cet immonde brigand, digne de la fourche, ce monstre affreux et horrible de la nature humaine, cet assemblage de tous les crimes, cet esclave le plus vil de tous, et le plus exécrationnel».

But there's a recent case which involves the literary discovery of a *progymnasma*, with whose help I'm hoping to fulfill at least one of the orator's duties, that of *delectare*. Our witness is Frank McCourt, author of *Angela's Ashes* and *'Tis*, as well as of the very recent *Teacher man*:

An excuse note is just a part of school life. Everyone knows they're fiction, so what's the big deal? Parents getting kids out of the house in the morning have little time for writing notes that they know will wind up in the school garbage anyway. They're so harried they'll say, Oh, you need an excuse note for yesterday, honey? Write it yourself and I'll sign it. They sign it without even looking at it and the sad part is they don't know what they're missing. If they could read those notes they'd discover their kids are capable of the finest American prose: fluent, imaginative, clear, dramatic,

fantastic, focused, persuasive, useful. [...] I wrote it on the board: “An Excuse Note from Adam to God” or “An excuse Note from Eve to God”. The heads went down. Pens raced across paper. They could do this with one hand tied behind their backs. With their eyes closed. Secret smiles around the room. Oh, this is a good one, baby, and we know what’s coming, don’t we? Adam blames Eve, Eve blames Adam. They both blame God or Lucifer. Blame all around except for God, who has the upper hand and kicks them out of Eden so that their descendants wind up in McKee Vocational and Technical High School writing excuse notes for the first man and woman, and maybe God Himself needs an excuse note for some of His big mistakes. [...] On the board: Judas, Attila the Hun, Lee Harvey Oswald, Al Capone and all the politicians in America.

Yo, Mr. McCourt, could you put teachers up there? Not you but all these pain-in-the-ass teachers that be giving us tests every other day.

Oh, I couldn’t do that. They’re my colleagues.

OK. OK, we can write excuse notes for them explaining why they have to be like that.<sup>25</sup>

To conclude: may we imagine that rhetoric and religion will be able to ‘rise’, to thrive together and to do this, most of all, in reciprocal balance? I’m an expert on rhetoric, not on religion, so I fear that I won’t be able to provide you with an answer. I can only share with you my personal idea and suggest to you my very own: ‘I have a dream’. I have a dream: that religion may be recognized as an argument far too demanding and delicate for human beings to handle. I have a dream: that rhetoric, of whom we are all so very fond, may by now be far too weary to be pushed towards yet another confrontation with and another useless challenge of ... Truth - this time the truth of religion.

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\* Plenary address delivered at the sixteenth biennial congress of the International Society for the History of Rhetoric in Strasbourg, July 28, 2007. I thank Laurent Pernot and the organizers of the congress, who invited me to deliver this plenary address, and Iris Müller who translated this text in English.

<sup>1</sup> VT, *Exodus* 3.2-4 (The New International Version).

<sup>2</sup> VT, *Exodus* 4.1.

<sup>3</sup> ἰσχνόφωνος, βραδύγλωσσος.

<sup>4</sup> VT, *Exodus* 4.10-17.

<sup>5</sup> K. Dowden, "Rhetoric and Religion", in I. Worthington, ed., *Companion to Greek Rhetoric* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007), 320-333 (p. 320). If I may add that, the *Companion* might have profited – also in Dowden's case - from a better knowledge of non-english European works on the subject. Just as an example: Laurent Pernot himself has published a crucial article, "The Rhetoric of Religion", *Rhetorica* 24 (2006): 235-254: it was the plenary address delivered two years ago at the wonderful and unforgettable Congress of the ISHR in Los Angeles (thanks once again to Lawrence Green). The *Centre d'Analyse des Rhétoriques Religieuses de l'Antiquité (C.A.R.R.A)*, on the other hand, has published an indispensable bibliography on public prayer: *Bibliographie analytique de la prière grecque et romaine (1898-1998)*, sous la direction de G. Freyburger et L. Pernot (Turnhout: Brepols, 2000); see also: *Corpus de prières grecques et romaines*, textes réunis, traduits et commentés par F. Chapot et B. Laurot (Turnhout: Brepols, 2001). Dowden (p. 320) rightly defines the public prayer as «a sort of a fictional speech of persuasion in front of an appreciative audience».

<sup>6</sup> VT, *Exodus* 4.15-16.

<sup>7</sup> F. Bader, "The language of the gods in Homer", in A.-F. Christidis, ed., *A History of Ancient Greek. From the Beginning to late Antiquity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 1388-13961 (p. 396).

<sup>8</sup> VT, *Exodus* 20.18.

<sup>9</sup> *De cultu feminarum* I 1.2.

<sup>10</sup> VT, *Gesesis* 3.12

<sup>11</sup> L. Spina, "Nec diu nos moretur quaestio quae rhetorices origo sit: perché si può ancora essere d'accordo con Quintiliano", in L. Calboli Montefusco, ed., *Papers on Rhetoric*, VII (Roma: Herder, 2006), 235-245 (p. 236).

<sup>12</sup> L. Pernot, "The Rhetoric of Religion", *Rhetorica* 24 (2006): 235-254 (pp. 235, 236).

<sup>13</sup> L. Pernot, "The Rhetoric of Religion", *Rhetorica* 24 (2006): 235-254 (p. 236).

<sup>14</sup> See L. Canfora, *Analogia e storia. L'uso politico dei paradigmi storici* (Milano: il Saggiatore, 1982), pp. 11-36.

<sup>15</sup> Herodotus, *Histories* I 32.9.

<sup>16</sup> J. Brainard, *I remember* (New York: XXX, 1975), p. XX.

<sup>17</sup> S. Wenzel, "The Arts of Preaching" in A. Minnis - I. Johnson, eds., *The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism*, vol. 2 *The Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 84-96.

<sup>18</sup> A Catholic writer, Roberto Beretta, has even gathered his thoughts and proposals on the argument in a book entitled *Da che pulpito: come difendersi dalle prediche* (Casale Monferrato: Piemme, 2006).

<sup>19</sup> I draw this information from G. Pozzi, *Grammatica e Retorica dei Santi* (Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 1997), ch. 5, *Parlare di Dio a Dio*, pp. 261-401.

<sup>20</sup> J. de la Bruyère, *Les caractères de Théophraste traduits du grec avec Les Caractères ou Les mœurs du ce siècle* (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1965): *De la chaire*, pp. 376-386 (p. 379, nr. 9); see also nr. 1,2,3,10,24,25,26).

<sup>21</sup> *Manuel II Paléologue. Entretiens avec un Musulman. 7<sup>e</sup> Controverse*, introduction, texte critique, traduction et notes par Th. Koury (Sources Chrétiennes 115, Paris: Les éditions du cerf, 1966), p. 123.

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<sup>22</sup> B. Garsten, *Saving persuasion. A Defense of Rhetoric and Judgement* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2006) p. 189.

<sup>23</sup> Jean-Luc Fournet has drawn up a considerable list of *ethopoiiai* found in Egyptian papyri, some of them on mythical-religious arguments: J.-L. Fournet, «Une éthopée de Caïn dans le Codex des Visions de la Fondation Bodmer», *ZPE* 92 (1992): 253-266 (pp. 256-259). See also E. Amato – G. Ventrella, “L’éthopée dans la pratique scolaire et littéraire. Répertoire complet”, in E. Amato – J. Schamp, eds., *ἨΘΟΠΟΙΙΑ. La représentation de caractères entre fiction scolaire et littéraire et réalité vivante à l’époque impériale et tardive* (Salerno: Helios, 2005), 213-231.

<sup>24</sup> A. Collinot – F. Mazière, *L’exercice de la parole. Fragments d’une rhétorique jésuite* (Paris: éditions des Cendres, 1987), 94-147.

<sup>25</sup> F. McCourt, *Teacher Man. A Memoir* (New York: Scribner, 2005), pp. 101, 106, 107.